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Maryland's Adoption of a Code of Evidence 
Lynn McLain 
·Consider your verdict," the King said to the jury. 
"Not yet, not yet!" the Rabbit hastily interrupted. "There's a great deal to come before that!" 
--Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
For the first time in its history, Maryland has a code of 
evidence Title 5 of the Maryland Rules to govern the 
admission of evidence at trial. Title 5, like the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, is in a number of ways more liberal as to admissibility 
(and, in others, less liberal) than was the common law. 
With the Court of Appeals' adoption of Title 5, effective July 
1, 1994, Maryland became the thirty-eighth state to adopt a code of 
evidence derived from the Federal Rules of Evidence, which became 
effective nineteen years earlier, July 1, 1975. Preliminary work 
was done on Title 5 by the Rodowsky Subcommittee of the Court of 
Appeals Rules Committee in 1976 and 1977, but the Court of Appeals 
decided that it was premature to proceed with codification, until 
there had been significant experience in the federal courts with 
the federal rules. 
In 1988, the court authorized the Rules Committee to begin 
anew proposing an evidence codification. The Chair of the 
Commi t tee, Chief Judge Alan M. Wilner of the Court of Special 
Appeals, assured the members of the Court of Appeals that the Rules 
Committee would not blithely propose Maryland's adoption of the 
federal rules, but would attempt to evaluate the applicable 
Maryland law, the federal rules and the cases construing them, and 
the laws of all other states having evidentiary codes, and draft 
proposed rules which it thought best for Maryland. Many of the 
choices turned on policy determinations, which were made ultimately 
by the Court of Appeals, after public hearings and other 
opportunities for public comment. 
The result is a code of evidence that is organized and 
numbered almost identically to the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, so as to facilitate the location, as 
persuasive authority, of cases in federal and other state 
jurisdictions construing similar rules. The rule numbers generally 
are the same as those of Federal Rules Evidence, except that the 
prefix "5-" - is added to the Maryland Rules. 1 Also, because the 
Maryland Rules do not address evidentiary privileges, there is no 
counterpart in Title 5 to Fed. R. Evid. 501. Evidentiary 
privileges in Maryland continue to be governed by constitutional 
provisions, myriad of statutes, and by common law. 
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1.There are a few exceptions. The subject matter addressed in 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (1) and 803(5) is found in Md. Rule 5-802.1, 
which lists five hearsay exceptions for certain out-of-court 
statements of witnesses who are testifying at the trial. 
"Admissions of party opponents," which are addressed in Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(d) (2), are governed by Md. Rule 5-803(a). The hearsay 
exceptions that are listed in Fed. R. Evid. 803 are found in Md. 
Rule 5-803 (b) Md. Rule 5-616 has no corollary in the federal 
rules. 
Nor is the pre-Title 5 Maryland law concerning the 
admissibility of evidence in general overruled, unless it is 
inconsistent with the Rules in Title 5. See Md. Rule 1-201 (c) . 
Because Title 5 is to a large extent a codification of the Maryland 
common law I those Maryland cases fleshing out the now codified 
common law rules will continue to inform as to the meaning of the 
Rules. 
The heart of 
contained in Rules 
Title 5 its alpha and its omega is 
5-401 through 5-403. Rules 5-401 and 5-402 
codify the fundamental requirement at common law that, in order to 
be admissible, evidence must be relevant to a fact that is of legal 
significance to the case. Rule 5-402 provides that all relevant 
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided "by 
constitution, statutes, or these rules, or by decisional law not 
inconsistent with these rules." For example, the federal and state 
constitutions would exclude evidence obtained in violation of the 
privilege against self-incrimination; the Maryland "dead man's 
statute," section 9 -116 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
article of the Code, would exclude certain relevant evidence; Rule 
5-411 generally excludes proof of insurance when offered on the 
question of liability; and case law provides that pleas of nolo 
contendere are inadmissible as statements of a party opponent, 
unless otherwise provided by rule (see the BV rules). Agnew v. 
State, 51 Md. App. 614, 651-53, 446 A.2d 425, 445-46, cert. denied, 
294 Md. 441 (1982). 
Rule 5-403 codifies the court's ability at common law to 
exclude even relevant evidence that is not excluded by more 
specific Rules, if the court finds that the risks of unfair 
prejudice, confusion or distraction of the fact-finder, or undue 
consumption of time substantially outweigh the proffered evidence's 
probative value. Again the pre-Title 5 case law stands, as a basis 
for interpreting the Rule. See,~, Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 
133, 138, 586 A.2d 15, 17 (1991); State v. Watson, 321 Md. 47, 57, 
580 A2d 1067, 1072 (1990) 
A number of the Maryland Rules reject the federal practice in 
favor of Maryland's traditional approach. For example, under Rule 
5-103(a) (1) counsel need not state the ground of objection, unless 
the court requests the ground. Rule 5-301 codifies Maryland's 
treatment of burden-of-production-of-the-evidence-shifting 
presumptions in civil cases set forth in Grier v. Rosenberg, 213 
Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737 (1957), which is somewhat of a middle ground 
between Fed. R. Evid. 301 and the Thayer-Wigmore "bursting bubble" 
and Unif. R. Evid. 301 which follows the Morgan approach. 
:.J 
Rule 5-802.1(a) builds on the Court of Appeals' revolutionary 
decision in Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993), and 
follows Hawaii's rule, permitting broader substantive use of a 
witness's prior inconsistent statements (if written and signed; or 
if stenographically or electionically recorded; or if made under 
oath at deposition, trial or in a hearing or another proceeding, 
.'I 
including a grand jury proceeding) than either was possible under 
the common law or is possible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
In the interest of judicial economy, Rule 5-902 (a) (11) follows 
a new provision in the Uniform Rules of Evidence that has no 
corollary in the Federal Rules, but is derived in part from 18 
U.S.C. § 3505. The Maryland Rule permits self-authentication of 
certified copies of business records, so as to avoid having to call 
a records custodian. Cf. Md. Rules 2-510(g) and 3-510(g) (hospital 
records) . 
Md. Rule 5-616, in an attempt to further one of the goals of 
codification, accessibility of the law, catalogues the methods of 
impeachment and rehabilitation of witnesses, as well as when 
extrinsic evidence of such matters is permitted. The federal rules 
contain no corollary to Rule 5-616. 
A few of the Rules speak to issues that are unaddressed by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and also change Maryland law. For 
example, Rule 5-615(c) permits a court in its discretion to allow 
a child witness's parents or another support person to remain in 
court during the child's testimony, despite a sequestration order. 
Rule 5-802.1(d) broadens the Maryland common law hearsay exception 
for prompt complaints of rape, so as to include prompt complaints 
of sexual assault, in general, and is not restricted to criminal 
cases. 
The language of some of the Maryland Rules resolves issues as 
to which the federal rules are inexplicit but the federal cases are 
relatively clear. For instance, Rule 5-408 provides that evidence 
of settlement negotiations in civil cases that would be protected 
in the civil case also will be inadmissible in criminal proceedings 
concerning the same subject matter. Other Maryland Rules resolve 
issues on which the federal cases are split. For example, Rule 5-
803 (b) (3) provides that a declarant's statement of intent is 
admissible only to prove the declarant's (and not another's) 
subsequent act. 
Rules in Title 5 that overrule Maryland cases in favor of the 
federal approach include, for instance, Rule 5-407, which follows 
the federal rule's policy of general exclusion of evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures, rather than Wilson v. Morris, 317 Md. 
284, 563 A.2d 392 (1989); Rules 5-803 (b) (16) and (18), which adopt 
hearsay exceptions for trustworthy ancient documents and for 
learned treatises; and Rules 5-803 (b) 24 and 5-804 (b) (5), which 
adopt the safety valve of residual hearsay exceptions to permit, 
"[u]nder exceptional circumstances," growth and development of the 
hearsay doctrine when appropriate. 
The Court of Appeals decided to leave resolution of some 
issues to its construction of the applicable Rule in case law, 
after briefing and argument, rather than ln the rule-making 
process. For example, the Court reserved judgment on whether its 
adoption of Rule 5-702 would lead to its following the more liberal 
approach to admission of expert testimony outlined in Daubert v. 
Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., U.S. ,113 S. Ct. 2786, 
125 L.Ed 2d 469 (1993), rather than Maryland's Frye-Reed test. 
See, ~, Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 291 A.2d 364 (1978). It 
also declined to adopt language making Rule 5-407 explicitly apply 
(or not) to products liability cases, an issue on which the federal 
circuits are divided. 
Although of course there are differences of opinion as to a 
number of the particular choices made in the Rules, the response of 
the bench and bar to date has been overwhelmingly positive to the 
act of codification. Those of us who participated in the project 
can only hope that they continue to feel that way, as they conduct 
trials under the Rules. 
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